



*American Model United Nations*  
**General Assembly First Committee**

GA First/I/4

SUBJECT OF RESOLUTION: Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction

SUBMITTED TO: The General Assembly First Committee

*The General Assembly First Committee,*

1 *Deeply concerned* about the proliferation of the development, production, and stockpiling of biological and  
2 toxin weapons and their destruction,

3 *Recognizing* the grave threat posed by biological weapons to humanity and the international community,

4 *Reaffirming* the commitment of Member States to maintain international peace and security,

5 *Guided by* the reduction and eradication of biological weapons,

6 *Alarmed by* the lack of any mechanisms through which safeguard processes and verifications of biological  
7 weapons may be regularly conducted,

8 *Aware of* the lack of collaboration in the enforcement of the Biological Weapon Convention Act,

9 *Determined* to increase transparency and accountability,

10 1. *Acknowledges* the Biological Weapons Convention Act to mandate the elimination of biological weapons;

11 2. *Notes* our current agreements and processes and their faults in the implementation and enforcement;

12 3. *Strongly encourages* Member States who are signatories to reassert themselves and non-signatories of the  
13 BWCA to join the Biological Weapons Convention Act;

14 4. *Urges* Member States to eradicate any biological weapons they might have and set legislation that moves  
15 toward the eradication of any biological weapons:

16 (a) Expresses its hope that member states will stay committed to their own legislation;

17 (b) Calls upon the dismantlement of recognized bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapon pro-  
18 duction technology, including;

19 (i) Initiating the orderly reduction of its component parts;

20 (ii) Adapting a process from nuclear dismantlement, “legacy” components shall be characterized  
21 and disposed of;

22 (iii) Characterizing components by their virality, visibility, and transmission vector;

23 (iv) Disposing of hazardous materials via safe means, which includes sterilization, incineration,  
24 and/or hydrolyzation of chemical agents;

25 (c) Express strong condemnations of the development, production, acquisition, transfer, and use of  
26 biological weapons;

27 (d) Call upon Member States to commit to the complete and verifiable banishment of such weapons  
28 from their arsenals;

29 5. *Encourages* that the imports and exports be tracked and reported to each Member state’s board:

30 (a) Requests that each Member State create regulatory boards in which they monitor imports and  
31 exports of toxins that could lead to the production of biological weapons and set standards against the creation of  
32 biological weapons;

(i) Boards will consist of locally appointed scientists with fields of expertise, governmental officials, and representatives of relevant Non Governmental Organizations;

(ii) Recommend Member states to authorize national boards to monitor and apply punitive financial assessments to those who violate the board's measures;

A. These assessments can be used to fund the regulatory boards;

(iii) Smaller governments may choose to work together in the creation of respective regional boards if each individual cannot afford to have an individual board;

A. In order to help economically developing countries afford this, it is based on a regional board to help with expenses and increase cooperation;

(iv) Boards will report to ISU on relevant information that arise when monitoring imports and exports;

(b) Calls to develop and maintain effective border controls to detect, deter, prevent, and combat illicit trafficking and brokering of such items in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law;

(c) Further, boards are paid for by the governments involved. Their boards are selected by a certain percentage of Gross Domestic Product;

6. *Urges* international cooperation:

(a) Establish a review process to assess the implementation and effectiveness of this resolution;

(b) Hopes to use the Australian Group, a multilateral export control regime working to impede the spread of biological weapons, that creates the AG Common Control List where identifiable weapons must be denied entry;

(i) This list is regularly monitored through discussion;

(c) Encourage Member States to open their facilities to international inspections and provide necessary information to the verification mechanism;

(d) Affirm the commitment of the international community to provide assistance and cooperation to States affected by the use or threat of biological weapons;

7. *Recommends* Member States and regional boards report to the Implementation Support Unit would be the international board to which each Member State's board can report in furtherance of the Member States commitment:

(a) Emphasize the importance of international cooperation in the fight against biological weapons;

(b) Engage in Confidence-Building Measures and compliance protocol to ensure constant monitoring of biological activities;

(c) Establish a robust international mechanism for the verification and monitoring of compliance with the banishment of biological weapons;

(d) Establish a system for Member States to share information, technology, and expertise to enhance the capabilities of all nations in preventing biological weapon proliferation;

8. *Recommends* increased support via additional staffing for the Implementation Support Unit pursuant to Article X of the Biological Weapons Convention in order to:

(a) Encourage Member States to open their facilities annually to international inspections and provide necessary information to the verification mechanism. ;

(b) Provide and establish systems to adequately train inspectors to conduct visits to relevant facilities in a timely manner;

9. *Calls upon* Member States to join Agreements to control exports and increase responsibilities;

10. We look to the Wassenaar Agreement that promotes transparency:

(a) Voluntary export control regime as an exchange of information on transfers of biological weapons;

- 78           11. We look to the Proliferation Security Initiative:
- 79                   (a) Create a partnership to eradicate the transport and delivery system;
- 80                   (b) Enhance existing export control enforcement mechanisms.

Passed, Yes: 29 / No: 20 / Abstain: 16